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REGULATING CORPORATE GOVERNANCE:
AMENDED RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
ALLOW LAWYERS TO MAKE THE WORLD A MORE
ETHICAL PLACE
Catharine E. Stark'
The recent exposure of fraudulent activity committed by companies
such as Enron and WorldCom has forced our Nation to scrutinize its
standards of professional ethics.' In the aftermath of these corporate
debacles, the federal government has taken measures to protect against
future occurrences of corporate fraud In July 2002, Congress passed the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act, which authorized the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) to enact rules that would establish higher standards
of professionalism and accountability not only for corporations and
accounting firms but also for the legal profession.' On August 5, 2003,
SEC rules imposing new standards obligating attorneys to report certain
instances of corporate misconduct took effect.4  One week later, the
o J.D. Candidate, May 2005, The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of
Law.
1. See Brooke A. Masters, ABA Eases Rule on Informing; Lawyers Can Now Report
Suspected Fraud by Clients, WASH. POST, Aug. 12, 2003, at El. The environment of
heightened scrutiny created by the collapse of Enron and magnified by the subsequent
collapse of WorldCom culminated with the ABA's vote on August 11, 2003, to relax
confidentiality rules, thereby permitting lawyers to report fraudulent activities by their
clients. See id.
2. E.g., 15 U.S.C. § 7245 (2003). Congress enacted the Sarbanes-Oxley Act on July
30, 2002, authorizing the SEC to set forth minimum standards of professionalism for the
auditing and legal professions; see Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys
Appearing and Practicing Before the Commission in the Representation of an Issuer, 17
C.F.R. pt. 205 (2003) (detailing SEC rules promulgated under the authority of Sarbanes-
Oxley establishing minimum standards of professionalism).
3. See 15 U.S.C. § 7245.
4. See 17 C.F.R. pt. 205. In part 205, the SEC went beyond establishing minimum
standards regarding the attorney's obligation to report. Id. Most significantly, part 205
also introduced a new corporate governance structure, the Qualified Legal Compliance
Committee (QLCC). Id. pt. 205.2(k). The QLCC is a committee composed of
independent directors, not employed by or otherwise personally interested in the
corporation's activities, and is authorized to investigate and report any material violations
by the corporation to the board of directors, or under certain circumstances, to the SEC.
See id. It was offered as an alternative to the proposed "noisy withdrawal" requirements
that would mandate attorneys to report any material violations by their client to the SEC.
There are many opponents to the SEC's introduction of the QLCC under part 205. For
example, the District of Columbia Bar argues:
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American Bar Association (ABA) adopted the new SEC standards for
the legal profession.!
The most significant changes in the ABA Model Rules of Professional
Conduct affect the confidential and privileged nature of the attorney-
client relationship. 6  The general rule of confidentiality, Rule 1.6,
requires that all communications and information relating to a client's
representation not be revealed.7 Prior to these changes, there were only
four express instances when a lawyer was permitted to disclose
confidential information. The amendments to Rule 1.6 add two new
exceptions, permitting a lawyer to disclose confidential information to
[T]he substantive thrust of the "noisy withdrawal" proposals, including the
proposed QLCC alternative, which would require self-reporting of possible, but
unadjudicated violations of law and state law fiduciary duties, is unprecedented
and is not an appropriate exercise of authority under Section 307 of Sarbanes-
Oxley or any provision of the federal securities laws.
DC BAR, COMMENTS OF THE CORPORATION, FINANCE AND SECURITIES LAW SECTION:
PART NINE, http://www.dcbar.org/for-lawyers/sections/corporation-finance-and
securities law/statement/part9.cfm (last visited June 8, 2004). In response to these
concerns, the SEC made clear that the final rules only apply to attorneys appearing or
practicing before the SEC. See 17 C.F.R. pt. 205. Also, the SEC clarified "that authority
to enforce compliance with these rules is vested solely in the SEC and no private right of
action is being created." WILSON SONSINI GOODRICH & ROSATI, SEC IMPLEMENTS
RULES ON ATrORNEY STANDARDS OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT-EXTENDS COMMENT
PERIOD FOR "NOISY WITHDRAWAL" PROVISIONS 1 (Feb. 2003), available at
http://www.wsgr.com/PDFSearch/Tab7-ProfConductMemo.pdf.
5. Compare 17 C.F.R. pt. 205, with MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6, 1.13
(2004) [hereinafter MODEL RULES] (adopting only SEC standards directly applicable to
lawyers). There is no incorporation in the ABA rules regarding the QLCC or other parts
of the SEC rules that apply to the greater structure of corporate governance. See MODEL
RULES, supra, R. 1.6, 1.13. Still, the ABA's adoption of the rules was not easily approved.
See Masters, supra note 1. In fact, the vote was almost evenly split, 218 to 201, in favor of
the amendments to Rule 1.6 of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct. Id. The vote
regarding the changes to Rule 1.13 was slightly less controversial, though the House of
Delegates still split 239 to 147. Conference Report: ABA Annual Meeting, 19 Laws. Man.
on Prof. Conduct (ABA/BNA) 467 (Aug. 13, 2003) [hereinafter Conference Report].
6. See Dennis Archer, Keynote Address: Why is Accountability Important?, 54 S.C.
L. REV. 881, 884 (2003). Archer commented that "[b]y granting the SEC broad power to
adopt new ethical rules for corporate lawyers, the Act could threaten the attorney-client
privilege, the work product doctrine, and other evidentiary rules designed to encourage
open and frank communications between the client and the advocate." Id.
7. MODEL RULES. supra note 5, R. 1.6(a). This section of the Model Rules is
intended to create a general prohibition against the disclosure of such information. See id.
Comment 3 to this rule asserts that confidentiality shall attach to any matter that relates to
client representation, regardless of its source. See id. R. 1.6 cmt. 3.
8. See id. R. 1.6(b); see also infra Part I.C (discussing the four limited exceptions to
the confidentiality rule: when there is a risk of death or bodily harm; when the lawyer
needs to secure legal advice regarding compliance with the Rules of Professional Conduct;
when the lawyer needs to defend himself in a controversy between the lawyer and a client;
or in compliance with the law or a court order).
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prevent a crime or fraud in furtherance of which the client has used the
lawyer's services and to prevent, mitigate, or rectify any substantial
injury that may result or has resulted from such a crime or fraudi An
additional change to Rule 1.13 further expands a lawyer's ability to
disclose confidential information.' Under the old rule, a lawyer was
obligated to report a client's illegal misconduct "up the ladder" to the
highest authority within the corporation." If internal reporting failed,
the attorney was permitted only to withdraw or resign from
representation. The newly amended Rule 1.13 permits a lawyer, under
certain circumstances, to report the continuance of the illegal misconduct
to outside authorities, such as the SEC."
The adoption of these rules has spurred massive controversy not only
within the legal profession but also in the corporate setting.' 4 Opponents
argue that the rules are a direct assault on the confidentiality inherent in
the attorney-client relationship.'" Furthermore, opponents argue that
this assault will undermine effective legal representation by decreasing
9. MODEL RULES, supra note 5, R. 1.6; see infra Part 1.F (discussing the two new
circumstances under which it may be permissible for a lawyer to disclose confidential
information relating to client representation).
10. MODEL RULES, supra note 5, R. 1.13: see also infra Part L.F (discussing the
amendment to Rule 1.13 as permitting a lawyer to use his or her discretion in the
determination of whether it may be necessary to reveal confidential information to an
outside authority).
11. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.13 (2003) (amended 2004) [hereinafter
2003 RULES]. Both the old rule and the new rule require the lawyer to report "up the
ladder" to a higher authority within the corporation: the new rule, however, changes what
course of action a lawyer may take if the higher authority does not take sufficient action to
stop the reported illegal activity. Id.; see also MODEL RULES, supra note 5, R. 1.13.
12. 2003 RULES, supra note 11, R. 1.13.
13. MODEL RULES, supra note 5, R. 1.13(c). The legislative history of Rule 1.13
demonstrates the ABA's intent to limit the reporting of illegal misconduct to outside
sources who have the authority and the capability to take preventive action. See AM. BAR
ASS'N: ADOPTED BY THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES § Ilt, at 6-7, http://www.abanet.org/
leadership/2003/journal/1 19b.pdf (last visited June 7, 2004).
14. See Steven Pearlstein, Not So Firm with Lawyers, WASH. POST, Aug. 13, 2003, at
El (referring to the issue of disclosure requirements as "an interesting issue, with good
arguments to be found on both sides. But in many ways, it's a sideshow that will have
much less impact on lawyers' behavior than stripping a few senior partners of their licenses
and draining the bank accounts of a couple of big law firms."); see also Masters, supra note
1 (discussing the Washington State Bar Association's feud with the SEC over the new
disclosure requirements).
15. See, e.g., Lance Cole, Revoking Our Privileges: Federal Law Enforcement's Multi-
front Assault on the Attorney-Client Privilege (and Why It Is Misguided), 48 VILL. L. REV.
469, 586-87 (2003); see also, e.g., Conference Report, supra note 5, at 467 (noting other
opposing arguments such as the erosion of values of client confidentiality, the vague
language of the rule defining fraud and disclosure requirements, and that the ABA should
not give in to outside regulation).
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clients' trust and confidence in their attorneys." Proponents of the
amended rules argue that the new reporting rules will aid in the
prevention of corporate fraud.'7 Proponents principally assert that
lawyers have an ethical duty to advise clients not to participate in illegal
fraudulent practices.'8 As a result, proponents argue, the attorney is as fit
a watchdog as any to report and assist in the prevention of corporate
misconduct.'
By taking measures to regulate not only the corporate but also the
legal arena the SEC has augmented lawyers' responsibilities to include
ensuring legal compliance by their clients."'  In fulfilling this greater
responsibility, opponents of the new rules argue that the amended rules
impose a new duty, requiring lawyers to betray their clients'
confidentiality." If this concern is valid, the new duty would directly
affect the traditional notions of confidentiality and privilege in
communications between attorneys and clients. 2  Bearing this concern in
16. See Jill E. Fisch & Kenneth M. Rosen, Is There a Role for Lawyers in Preventing
Future Enrons?, 48 VILL. L. REV. 1097, 1101 (2003) (arguing that "mandatory rules,
backed by the threat of SEC sanctions, may be counterproductive as a tool for increasing
the effectiveness of client representation").
17. See Christina R. Salem, The New Mandate of the Corporate Lawyer After the Fall
of Enron and the Enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 8 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L.
765, 784 (2003) (noting that, "[w]ithout the threat of lawyer disclosure, devious corporate
agents will likely be more susceptible to stray from the law").
18. See Irma S. Russell, Keeping the Wheels on the Wagon: Observations on Issues of
Legal Ethics for Lawyers Representing Business Organizations, 3 WYO. L. REV. 513, 543-
45 (2003) (discussing the changes to the Model Rules and noting the importance of the
lawyer's role in the crime-fraud exception).
19. See 148 CONG. REC. S6551 (daily ed. July 10, 2002) (statement of Sen. Edwards)
(stating that "wherever you see corporate executives and accountants working, lawyers are
virtually always there looking over their shoulder").
20. See Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys Appearing and Practicing
Before the Commission in the Representation of an Issuer, 17 C.F.R. pt. 205.1 (2003).
Acting under the authority of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, the SEC set forth rules creating
greater accountability for gatekeepers -accountants, analysts, and attorneys-in order to
improve corporate decision-making. Jill E. Fisch & Caroline M. Gentile, The Qualified
Legal Compliance Committee: Using the Attorney Conduct Rules to Restructure the Board
of Directors, 53 DUKE L.J. 517, 519 (2003). In addition, the SEC created an alternative
mechanism, the Qualified Legal Compliance Committee (QLCC), to improve the
decision-making process. See 17 C.F.R. pt. 205.3(c). By creating this alternative
mechanism within the corporate arena, the burden on the legal profession may be
somewhat relieved. See id. That is, if a corporation has created a QLCC to monitor its
activities, the lawyer may only be required to report any material violation to the QLCC.
See id. pt. 205.3(c)(1). Then the QLCC, not the lawyer, will be responsible for
investigating and further reporting that violation. See id. Therefore, the focus would shift
away from the lawyer toward the board of directors. Fisch & Gentile, supra at 584.
21. See Fisch & Rosen, supra note 16, at 1100-01.
22. See MODEL RULES, supra note 5, R. 1.6(b). The amended rule creates two new
exceptions for when an attorney may disclose confidential information relating to the
11,98 [Vol. 53:1195
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mind, the ABA's adoption of the SEC rules signals the legal profession's
awareness of public criticism surrounding its role in the recent failures of
corporate governance.23 Adopting the rules demonstrates a willingness
to satisfy this higher responsibility. 4 Still, the goal is a system of legal
ethics that ensures the prevention of corporate fraud while affording a
high level of protection to attorney-client confidentiality.25 At present,
lawyers and law firms across the country are adjusting to the amended
rules.26
This Comment analyzes the fiduciary duties that flow from the
corporate lawyer to the corporate client in an effort to determine what
representation of a client. See infra Part I.F. But see infra Part III (arguing that although
the rule allows for two new exceptions, because of the limited nature of the exceptions,
there is no harm done to the attorney-client relationship).
23. See REPORT OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION TASK FORCE ON
CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY 18-19 (Mar. 31, 2003), available at http://www.abanet.org/
buslaw/corporateresponsibility/final-report.pdf [hereinafter ABA REPORT] (commenting
that public observers have asserted that along with the private sector participants, lawyers
also bear responsibility for corporate failures); see also Mike France, What About the
Lawyers?, BUS. WK., Dec. 23, 2002, at 58-62 (revealing the attorneys' role in the
perpetration of the Enron scandal). By drafting documents that execute corporate
dealings and writing opinion letters that vouch for the legality of those dealings, lawyers
inevitably play a critical role in the execution of any corporate action. Id. For this reason,
the legal profession has fallen within the focus of the heightened scrutiny surrounding
corporate misconduct. See id. In its recommendation of new Rule 1.13, the ABA Task
Force noted that, "[k]nowledgeable observers have asserted that through inaction,
inattention, indifference or, in some cases, conflicting personal interests or loyalties, some
of these participants [including counsel] bear significant responsibility for these
[corporate] failures, and lawyers have not been excluded from such assertions." ABA
REPORT, supra at 18-19, 34-35.
24. See ABA REPORT, supra note 23, at 40-47; see also Susan R. Martyn, In Defense
of Client-Lawyer Confidentiality... and Its Exceptions .... 81 NEB. L. REV. 1320, 1350
(2003) (emphasizing the increasing importance of facilitating law enforcement in the
government's efforts to amend the rules to permit broader exceptions to the rule of
confidentiality).
25. See 148 CONG. REC. S6551 (daily ed. July 10, 2002) (statement of Sen. Edwards);
see also ABA REPORT, supra note 23, at 24-25 (stating that the intent behind the changes
to the Model Rules of Professional Conduct is "to enhance the lawyer's ability to exercise
and bring to bear independent professional judgment, and thereby enhance the lawyer's
ability to promote corporate responsibility without undermining the constructive and
collaborative relationship that must exist with the client so that compliance with law can
be most effectively promoted").
26. Brooke A. Masters, New Rules Leave Lawyers in Bind on Whistle-blowing,
WASH. POST, Aug. 6, 2003, at El (noting that legal departments and law firms have
implemented new policies and procedures as well as training programs to teach
compliance with the new reporting requirements); see, e.g., FRIED, FRANK, HARRIS,
SHRIVER & JACOBSON, SEC "UP-THE-LADDER" REPORTING REQUIREMENT:
PRACTICAL SUGGESTIONS FOR IN HOUSE ATTORNEYS 1-5 (July 18, 2003), available at
http://www.ffhsj.com/cmemos/030718-Ladder.pdf [hereinafter "UP-THE-LADDER"]
(suggesting methods by which law firms might adjust to the new rules).
2004] 1199
Catholic University Law Review
effect the amended rules of professional conduct will have on the
attorney-client privilege. First, this Comment considers the existing
structure of intra-corporate fiduciary duties and the traditional role of
the corporate lawyer. Next, this Comment traces the evolution of the
recent legislation that brought about the adoption of these rules.
Through a close examination of the plain language and legislative intent
behind the amended rules, this Comment considers when a lawyer is
required, or permitted, to act under the new rules and when a lawyer
becomes liable for inaction. Finally, this Comment explains the impact
of the new rules on the role of the lawyer in representing a corporate
client. It concludes that the new rules support the prevention of
corporate fraud while still protecting the confidential nature of the
attorney-client relationship.
1. A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE LAWYER'S ROLE IN CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE
A. The Corporation as a Client: The Traditional Relationship Between
Attorney and Client
An examination of the intra-corporate and lawyer-corporation
fiduciary relationships illustrates how significantly the amended Model
Rules of Professional Conduct may impact the relationship between
corporate lawyer and client. 7 A system of corporate governance limits
the impact that management decisions may have on the constituents of
27. See 148 CONG. REC. S6551 (daily ed. July 10, 2002) (statement of Sen. Edwards)
(noting that lawyers may play a critical role in protecting against failures in the system of
corporate governance). The post-Enron reforms are directed at the legal profession
because the system of corporate governance has failed. See infra Part II (analyzing the
intent of the amended rules). Actions by Congress and the SEC show the need for
lawyers and accountants to act as effective gatekeepers to restore the system. See Fisch &
Gentile, supra note 20, at 519-21, 535-36. Until the recent corporate- governance failures,
however, state courts and the SEC had limited their focus to board strength and
independence when determining how to best remedy improper corporate decisions. See,
e.g., In re Walt Disney Co. Deriv. Litig., 825 A.2d 275 (Del. Ch. 2003) (denying a motion
to dismiss because plaintiff alleged facts sufficient for a jury to find that directors breached
their fiduciary duty of care in employment decisions); see also H. Lowell Brown, The
Corporate Director's Compliance Oversight Responsibility in the Post Caremark Era, 26
DEL. J. CORP. L. 1, 44-45 (2001). In In re Walt Disney, the court noted that it would be
more "hesitant to second-guess the business judgment of a disinterested and independent
board of directors." 825 A.2d at 278. Now, the focus has changed. Legislators and courts
seek the assistance of outsiders in ensuring legal compliance by corporations. See, e.g.,
Fisch & Gentile, supra note 20. at 7 (noting that in Sarbanes-Oxley, "Congress focused its
efforts primarily on advisors ... rather than on the executives who run the corporations
(and who bore primary responsibility for the wrongdoing) or the directors who oversee
the decisions made by the executives (and who acquiesced in the wrongdoing).").
[Vol. 53:11951200
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the corporation (e.g., shareholders, employees, officers, and directors). 28
Because it forms legally enforceable duties, the fiduciary relationship
between management and shareholders plays a fundamental role in this
system.'9 Through corporate governance, management becomes liable
for breaching a fiduciary duty by failing to act in the best interest of the
corporation.3'
For example, in In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litigation,3 the Court
of Chancery of Delaware denied defendant directors' motion to dismiss
the shareholders' complaint alleging a breach of the fiduciary duty of
care by the directors.3 2 Courts generally hesitate to second-guess the
business judgment rule.33 However, in this case the court determined
28. See MODEL RULES, supra note 5, R. 1.13 cmt. 1 (defining the constituents of the
corporation as officers, directors, employees, and shareholders); see also BLACKWELL
ENCYCLOPEDIC DICTIONARY OF BUSINESS ETHICS 147 (1997) [hereinafter ETHICS
DICTIONARY]; see also John R. Boatright, Fiduciary Duties and the Shareholder-
Management Relation: Or, What's So Special About Shareholders?, 4 BUS. ETHICS Q., 393-
407 (1994) [hereinafter Fiduciary Duties].
29. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 1 (2000) (defining fiduciary duties
as the duty of care, loyalty, and obedience); see also ETHICS DICTIONARY, supra note 28,
at 147; see also Boatright, supra note 28 at 394 (emphasizing the importance of the
shareholder right to elect directors who act as fiduciaries in the management of the
corporation). Boatright argues that "[s]ince these various rights and duties are legally
enforceable, they provide a relatively effective solution to the problem of accountability."
See id.
30. See, e.g., MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.31(a) (2003) (stating instances when a
director may be held liable for breaching a fiduciary duty). First, a director may be liable
for action not taken in good faith. See id. § 8.31 (a)(2)(i). Second, a director may be liable
if the action results from a decision that the director did not reasonably believe to be in
the best interests of the corporation, or as to which the director was not sufficiently
informed. See id. § 8.31(a)(2)(ii). Third, directorial liability will attach if the director's
action is influenced by a personal relationship with, or a lack of independence from,
another person who has a material interest in the action. See id. § 8.31 (a)(2)(iii).
31. In re Walt Disney Co., 825 A.2d at 275.
32. See id. at 291; see also In re Caremark Int'l, 698 A.2d 959, 967 (Del. Ch. 1996)
(noting that directorial liability for a breach of fiduciary duty may arise in two contexts).
In this case, the court ruled:
First, such liability may be said to follow from a board decision that results in a
loss because that decision was ill advised or "negligent." Second, liability to the
corporation for a loss may be said to arise from an unconsidered failure of the
board to act in circumstances in which due attention would, arguably, have
prevented the loss.
Id.
33. See, e.g., Shlensky v. Wrigley, 237 N.E.2d 776 (I11. App. Ct. 1998). In Shlensky,
the court deferred to the business judgment of the directors. In doing so, the court noted:
Directors are elected for their business capabilities and judgment and the courts
cannot require them to forego their judgment because of the decisions of
directors of other companies. Courts may not decide these questions in the
absence of a clear showing of dereliction of duty on the part of the specific
directors and mere failure to "follow the crowd" is not such a dereliction.
2004] 1201,
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that directors who fail to exercise any business judgment, or to make a
good faith effort to fulfill the fiduciary duties owed to shareholders, may
be held liable)4  Corporate constituents cannot always resolve their
conflicting interests, and occasionally must seek help in the form of a
judicial remedy to correct failures of corporate governance.
In our system of corporate governance, a lawyer representing a
corporation owes his or her ethical duty to the corporation itself. 6  In
other words, the lawyer has a duty to act in the best interests of the client
organization, not in the independent interests of management or
shareholders. 3  Therefore, in the protection of a working system of
Id. at 781.
34. See In re Walt Disney Co., 825 A.2d at 289. Determining the boundary of the
business judgment rule, the court stated:
[A]II of the alleged facts, if true, imply that defendant directors knew that they
were making material decisions without adequate information and without
adequate deliberation, and that they simply did not care if the decisions caused
the corporation and its stockholders to suffer injury or loss. Viewed in this light,
plaintiffs' new complaint sufficiently alleges a breach of the directors' obligation
to act honestly and in good faith in the corporation's best interests for a Court to
conclude, if the facts are true, that the defendant directors' conduct fell outside
the protection of the business judgment rule.
Id.
35. See, e.g., In re Abbott Labs. Derivative S'holders Litig., 325 F.3d 795 (7th Cir.
2003) (holding that directors had breached their duty of loyalty owed to the corporation's
shareholders). Corporate governance is most vulnerable when a conflict of interest arises
between management and the shareholders. See Rosman v. Shapiro, 653 F. Supp. 1441,
1446 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (holding that a lawyer will be disqualified where a conflict of interest
arises between two shareholders, each reasonably believing he or she was the lawyer's
client). The ABA Task Force also discussed the problems associated with the occurrence
of conflicting interests. See ABA REPORT, supra note 23, at 25-30. Specifically, the task
force noted the temptation of executive officers to maximize their own self-interest at the
expense of long-term corporate welfare. See id. Another conflict arises when corporate
officers who benefit from reporting information reflecting positive growth do not inform
shareholders of financial setbacks. See id.; see also Enron Heads Knew of Deals to Grow
Earnings: WSJ, REDIFF.COM, Jan. 2, 2002, http://www.rediff.com/money/2002/
jan/02enron.htm [hereinafter Enron Heads] (discussing Enron executives' fraudulent
misrepresentation of financial accounting information).
36. See Jesse v. Danforth, 485 N.W.2d 63, 66 (Wis. 1992). In this case, the court
describes the corporate entity rule, holding that if a lawyer represents individuals in the
creation of a corporation, once incorporation has occurred, that lawyer retroactively
represents the corporation, not the individuals. See id. The modern test applied to
determine whether a lawyer represents an individual or a corporation is the "reasonable
expectation" test set forth by the court in Rosman. See 653 F. Supp. at 1446.
37. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 96(l)(b)(2) (2000)
[hereinafter RESTATEMENT GOVERNING LAWYERS]. This duty is also spelled out in the
Model Rules of Professional Conduct. See MODEL RULES, supra note 5, R. 1.13. Rule
1.13 states that the lawyer "represents the organization acting through its duly authorized
constituents." Id. The rationale for this rule is that corporations are independent legal
1202 [Vol. 53:1195
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corporate governance, the confidentiality of communications between
the attorney and client, as well as the attorney-client privilege, flow not
to the individuals of the corporation, but to the corporation as its own
legal entity.'
B. Confidentiality and Privilege
The principles of confidentiality and privilege form essential elements
of the attorney-client relationship.
3
' Each may exist independently.
4
Whereas confidentiality applies to communication involving information
exchanged within a protected relationship, privilege may or may not
attach to those communications.41 In order to qualify as a privileged
communication, the parties must have an intention of confidentiality
and the communication must have some basis for protection, such as
seeking and rendering legal representation.43  If the communication
meets both criteria, then privilege exempts the communication from
either party's duty of disclosure.44 But, privilege will not arise unless both
parties contemplate the existence of an attorney-client relationship.
4
'
entities that require representation, but can act only through their constituents. See id. at
R. 1.13 cmt. 1.
38. See Danforth, 485 N.W.2d at 66; 2003 RULES, supra note 11, R. 1.13.
39. See Freeman v. Chi. Musical Instrument Co., 689 F.2d 715, 721 (7th Cir. 1982);
Am. Can Co. v. Citrus Feed Co., 436 F.2d 1125, 1128 (5th Cir. 1971); Baird v. Koerner, 279
F.2d 623, 635 (9th Cir. 1960); Consol. Theatres, Inc. v. Warner Bros. Circuit Mgmt. Corp.,
216 F.2d 920, 927 (2d Cir. 1954). Each of these cases noted that it is part of a court's duty
to protect the privacy of the attorney-client relationship. E.g., Freeman, 689 F.2d at 721.
40. See Lawyer Disciplinary Bd. v. McGraw, 461 S.E.2d 850, 859 (W. Va. 1995)
(noting that the ethical duty of confidentiality and the evidentiary rule of attorney-client
privilege are both factors determinative of whether information is confidential). The
amended rules do not seek to alter the confidential nature of a communication. Rather,
the new rules expand the circumstances under which the attorney-client privilege may be
lifted to allow a lawyer to disclose confidential information. See MODEL RULES, supra
note 5, R. 1.6.
41. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 273 (7th ed. 1999): JOHN H. WIGMORE, A
STUDENTS' TEXTBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 391 (The Foundation Press, Inc.
1935).
42. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 41 (defining privileged
communication as "communication that is protected by law from forced disclosure").
43. See WIGMORE, supra note 41, at 391-92 (noting that when a communication falls
within the scope of seeking and rendering legal representation, public policy supports the
formation of a privileged and confidential relationship).
44. See id. at 392-93.
45. See I FRANKLIN D. CLECKLEY, HANDBOOK ON EVIDENCE FOR WEST VIRGINIA
LAWYERS § 5-4(E)(2)(e) (3d ed. 1994); see also RESTATEMENT GOVERNING LAWYERS,
supra note 37, § 14 (describing the formation of a client-lawyer relationship). In order to
form a client-lawyer relationship, the client must manifest to the lawyer his or her intent
that the lawyer will provide services in a legal capacity, and the lawyer consents or
reasonably should know that the client is relying on him or her to do so. Id. § 14(1).
2004] 1203
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Once the parties form an attorney-client relationship, confidentiality
attaches to all communications between the parties that are related to the
46representation. Privilege, on the other hand, attaches only to
communications that arise within the scope of seeking and rendering
legal counsel.47 Public policy supports the confidentiality ensured by the
attorney-client relationship. 48 The protection offered by the
confidentiality rule bolsters the effectiveness of legal representation by
diminishing client reluctance to share true and accurate information.
Alternatively, such a relationship can be formed if a tribunal appoints a lawyer to do so.
Id. § 14(2). In Upjohn Co. v. United States, the Supreme Court ruled on the issue of when
privilege will attach to communications between a corporate client and its lawyer. 449
U.S. 383, 395-96 (1981). There, the Supreme Court concluded that privilege did protect
communications between the company's employees and its general counsel regarding
questionable payments made for the benefit of foreign government officials to secure
government business. Id. at 386. In his concurring opinion, Chief Justice Burger spelled
out the general rule set forth in the majority opinion:
[A] communication is privileged at least when, as here, an employee or former
employee speaks at the direction of the management with an attorney regarding
conduct or proposed conduct within the scope of employment. The attorney
must be one authorized by the management to inquire into the subject and must
be seeking information to assist counsel in performing any of the following
functions: (a) evaluating whether the employee's conduct has bound or would
bind the corporation; (b) assessing the legal consequences, if any, of that
conduct; or (c) formulating appropriate legal responses to actions that have been
or may be taken by others with regard to that conduct.
Id. at 403. When a communication is intended by the client to assist the lawyer in the
effective legal representation of that client, it will be protected by the attorney-client
privilege. See id. at 394.
46. MODEL RULES, supra note 5, R. 1.6.
47. See WIGMORE, supra note 41, at 392-93. Wigmore defines the scope of privilege:
(1) Where legal advice of any kind is sought, (2) from a professional legal advisor
in his capacity as such, (3) the communications relevant to the purpose, (4) made
in confidence by the client, (5) are at his instance protected permanently from
disclosure by either himself or his legal adviser, (6) except the protection be
waived.
Id.
48. See id. at 391-92. The benefit of attaching privilege to the attorney-client
relationship clearly outweighs the harm that would result if privilege did not attach. See
id. at 392. The outcome of the balance is as follows:
It is obvious that little loss is caused to the investigation of facts by allowing the
privilege; for the attorney could only report the statements made to him by the
client, and by testimonial process the client himself (in civil cases) could equally
be made to disclose his knowledge. On the other hand, the harm to the relation
by requiring disclosure is also plain; for the attorney must be fully and candidly
informed on the case by his client, and clients would tend to withhold such
information if the law could immediately force the attorney to repeat it to the
court.
Id.
49. See, e.g., Purcell v. Dist. Attorney, 676 N.E.2d 436, 437-38 (Mass. 1997); Foster v.
Hall, 29 Mass. (1 Pick.) 89, 98 (1831) (commenting on the public policy supporting full
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As a result, courts have held that the rules of professionalism impose a
broad duty of confidentiality on lawyers regarding information
511
concerning their client's representation.
For example, in Harris v. Baltimore Sun Co.," the court interpreted the
scope of the confidential protection granted to "information relating to
representation of a client" to preclude counsel from revealing public
documents to the detriment of the client.2 The Maryland Court of
Appeals first noted that the unprivileged nature of public records did not
necessarily deprive them of the protection of confidentiality. 3 The court
interpreted Maryland Rule 1.6 as imposing a very broad obligation of
confidentiality.54  Ultimately, the court held that Maryland Rule 1.6
"should be read to prohibit those needless revelations of client
information that incur some risk of harm to the client. ' 55 In his dissent,
Judge Chasanow argued that a literal reading of the language of
Maryland Rule 1.6 demonstrates the confidentiality rule was intended as
a broad, absolute protection of information, with only enumeratedS 56
exceptions allowing for disclosure of such information.-
Both the majority rationale and Judge Chasanow's dissent support the
broad confidentiality rule intended by the ABA's Model Rules of
Professional Conduct. 7 For example, the comment to Rule 1.6 states
that the duty of confidentiality covers any information relating to the
representation, regardless of its source.5 This language further supports
disclosure between client and lawyer). These cases note the long-standing principle that
"[t]he attorney-client privilege is founded on the necessity that a client be free to reveal
information to an attorney, without fear of its disclosure, in order to obtain informed legal
advice." E.g., Purcell, 676 N.E.2d at 438.
50. See, e.g., Harris v. Baltimore Sun Co., 625 A.2d 941, 945 (Md. 1993); see also
MODEL RULES, supra note 5, R. 1.6 cmt. 3 (stating that the rule of confidentiality should
apply to all information relating to the representation, not only to matters communicated
in confidence by the client).
51. Harris, 625 A.2d at 941.
52. Id. at 945. In that case, the court interpreted Maryland Lawyers' Rules of
Professional Conduct Rule 1.6. See MD. LAWYERS' RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6
(1987) (amended 2004). The pertinent language of the Maryland rules is the same as the
Model Rules of Professional Conduct.
53. See Harris, 625 A.2d at 944.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 947 (quoting C. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICs 301 (1986)). The
court reversed and remanded the case to determine whether the information revealed was
indeed harmful to the client. Id. at 948.
56. Id. at 949 (Chasanow, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see infra Part
I.C (discussing the enumerated exceptions to the confidentiality rule).
57. See Harris, 625 A.2d at 944-45, 949.
58. MODEL RULES, supra note 5, R. 1.6 cmt. 3.
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the conclusion that the ABA intended the rule's broad scope of
59
coverage.
C. Limited Exceptions to the Rule of Confidentiality
Although states differ in their standards of professional conduct, each
traditionally has allowed limited exceptions to the broad rule of
confidentiality.60 A facial examination of Model Rule 1.6 allows a lawyer
to disclose confidential information under limited circumstances. 6 These
exceptions arise when a public interest outweighs the social interest of
upholding the confidentiality of attorney-client communications.62
Traditionally, Rule 1.6 created four exceptions allowing a lawyer to
disclose confidential information: when there is a reasonably certain risk
of death or substantial bodily harm;63 when a lawyer must secure legal
advice regarding compliance with the Rules of Professional Conduct;
64
when a lawyer needs to defend himself or herself against a claim by the
client;6 or when a lawyer acts in compliance with the law or a court
order.66
Although the prohibition against disclosing confidential information
has been interpreted broadly,67 the exceptions were intended for narrow
interpretation."" Permissive disclosure under these exceptions occurs
when a lawyer reasonably believes it necessary to accomplish the express
purposes of the exceptions.6 9  Though a lawyer has discretion in
59. See id. The comment describes the confidentiality rule as "appl[ying] not only to
matters communicated in confidence by the client but also to all information relating to
the representation, whatever its source." Id.
60. See, e.g., CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY DR 4-101(c)(1)-(4) (1970), reprinted
in N.Y. STATE BAR ASS'N, HANDBOOK ON PROF'L ETHICS AND RESPONSIBILITY (1970)
(allowing exceptions to the confidentiality rule in four instances: (1) where the lawyer has
the consent of his or her client, but only after full disclosure to the client; (2) "when
permitted under the Disciplinary Rules or required by law or court order"; (3) to prevent
a crime; or (4) where the lawyer needs to defend himself against an accusation of wrongful
conduct); see also United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357, 358-59 (D.
Mass. 1950) (noting the distinction between confidential information and information that
may be privileged because of the existence of an attorney-client relationship). The
confidentiality rule prescribed by the Model Rules of Professional Conduct applies to
confidential information, not necessarily to the attorney-client privilege. See MODEL
RULES, supra note 5, R. 1.6.
61. 2003 RULES, supra note 11, R. 1.6(b).
62. See id. R. 1.6 cmt. 6.
63. See id. R. 1.6(b)(1).
64. Seeid. R. 1.6(b)(2).
65. See id. R. 1.6(b)(3).
66. See id. R. 1.6(b)(4).
67. See supra Part I.B.
68. See 2003 RULES, supra note 11, R. 1.6 cmt. 6.
69. See id. R. 1.6 cmt. 12.
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determining the necessity of disclosure, the comments to Rule 1.6 outline
specific factors he or she should consider in making this determination.
7 1
By laying out stringent guidelines, the comment to Rule 1.6 sets forth
limitations for when the lawyer may actually make disclosures. This
demonstrates the ABA's intent to apply a narrow interpretation to these
• 71
exceptions. S 72
Courts also have narrowly interpreted these exceptions. For
example, in In re Goebel,7 the Supreme Court of Indiana reprimanded
an attorney for violating Rule 1.6 of the Indiana Rules of Professional
Conduct when he disclosed confidential information to prevent his own
death or serious bodily harm.' In that case, the client revealed to his
attorney his intent to kill an adverse witness. After the client demanded
that his attorney reveal the address of the witness, the attorney did so, in
violation of the confidentiality of information rule.76  The court noted
that Indiana Rule 1.6(b) allowed the attorney to disclose confidential
information to prevent criminal conduct, 7  but that in this case the lawyer
had improperly exercised his discretion.7 The court determined that the
attorney's self-interest was not sufficient justification for his exercise of
discretion under the narrow exception to the rule.79 Indeed, the lawyer's
use of discretion is only justified when used in furtherance of an express
purpose set forth in the enumerated exceptions to the rule."" In coming
to this conclusion, the court focused on the policy behind Rule 1.6, noting
that "[t]he observance of the ethical obligation of a lawyer to hold
inviolate confidential information of the client not only facilitates the full
70. Id. R. 1.6 cmt. 13 (listing factors such as the nature of the attorney-client
relationship, the relationship between the lawyer and those injured, and the lawyer's
experience and involvement with the specific transaction).
71. Id. R. 1.6 cmts. 6-13.
72. See In re Goebel, 703 N.E.2d 1045, 1049 (Ind. 1998).
73. Id.
74. See id.
75. See id. at 1047. The witness was also a client of the attorney's law firm. Id. at
1046-47.
76. See id. at 1047.
77. See id. at 1048.
78. See id.
79. See id.; see also Plan Comm. in the Driggs Reorganization Case v. Driggs, 217
B.R. 67, 71 n.6 (1998) (stating that attorney's disclosures were proper under Rule 1.6(b)).
The court in Driggs noted that an attorney seeking to justify disclosure of confidential
information has a high burden of proof, while an attorney seeking to justify disclosure
under a crime-fraud exception typically has a lesser burden. Id. (citing X Corp. v. Doe,
805 F.Supp. 1298, 1309 (E.D. Va. 1992)). The court then stated that the first step in
determining whether disclosure is justified is determining whether it was "warranted
under the higher standard arguably established by Rule 1.6(b)." Id. at 72 n.6.
80. MODEL RULES, supra note 5, R. 1.6(b).
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development of facts essential to proper representation of the client, but
also encourages individuals to seek early legal assistance." ''
D. Corporate Fraud and Secondary Liability
In recent history, several issues surrounding confidentiality and
privilege have arisen in the corporate setting.s2 Most significantly, cases
of corporate fraud have raised the issue of lawyer liability for non-
disclosure in cases where corporate clients participate in illegal activity. 3
In 1994, the Supreme Court considered the scope of section 10(b) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 in the case of Central Bank of Denver v.
First Interstate Bank of Denver.'4 Section 10(b) makes it unlawful to
commit fraud in the purchase or sale of securities."' After examining the
statutory text, congressional intent, and policy considerations, the Court
held that section 10(b) required scienter evident in primary participation,
but did not necessarily transfer liability to secondary participants in
fraudulent sales or purchases of securities. 6 Therefore, the Court held
that no private cause of action was applicable against secondary actors,
such as lawyers, accountants, and banks, for mere aiding and abetting."'
81. In re Goebel, 703 N.E. 2d at 1049.
82. See, e.g., Newby v. Enron Corp. (In re Enron Corp. Sec., Derivative & ERISA
Litig.), 235 F. Supp. 2d 549, 657-73 (S.D. Tex. 2002).
83. See infra text accompanying notes 90-94, 103-11 (using Enron and WorldCom as
examples of this phenomenon).
84. Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164, 166-67
(1994) (stating the issue in the case was to determine whether section 10(b) liability
extends equally to those who merely aid and abet the violation as well as to those who
actually engage in the manipulation or deception).
85. 15 U.S.C. § 78j (West Supp. 2003). Section 10(b) states:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce . . . . To use or employ, in
connection with the purchase or sale of any security registered on a national
securities exchange or any security not so registered, . . . any manipulative or
deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as
the [SEC] may prescribe ....
Id. § 78j(b).
86. See Central Bank, 511 U.S. at 191.
87. Id. (noting that a secondary actor may be held liable when that actor participates
in a manipulation or deception on which a purchaser or seller of securities relies). Since
the Central Bank decision, the courts have considered secondary liability in several cases.
The circuits are currently split on what test should apply to determine when secondary
actors may be held liable. See WElL, GOTSHAL & MANGES, SARBANES-OXLEY
MATERIALS: IMPORTANT RULING CONCERNING LIABILITY OF SECONDARY ACTORS IN
SECURITIES MARKETS, INCLUDING INVESTMENT BANKING, ACCOUNTING AND LAW
FIRMS, http://www.weil.com/wgm/cWGMPubs.nsf0/701cd6715a22b4dd85256c5b004a487e
?Opendocument (Dec. 2002) [hereinafter SARBANES-OXLEY UPDATES]. The Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit applied the "bright line" test in Wright v. Ernst & Young
LLP, 152 F.3d 169, 175 (2d Cir. 1998), to affirm the lower court's dismissal of appellant's
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The Court in Central Bank held that unless a lawyer serves as a primary
actor in the execution of the fraud, the Act does not subject the lawyer to
liability.Y" In 2003, this rule was superseded by statute, thereby increasing
the potential for liability of secondary actors."
Two of the largest and most well-known cases of corporate fraud
occurred in 2001 and 20027' In December of 2001, the Enron scandal
spurred a massive investigation that led to the uncovering of several
other instances of corporate wrongdoing.9' The Enron scandal involved
the creation of illegal financial partnerships. 2 Enron financial directors
removed Enron's debt from its balance sheet and attributed it to these
partnerships in order to attain good credit ratings."' Due to these actions,
complaint. See id. The "bright line" test is a two-prong test requiring that in order to be
liable, a secondary actor must make a "material misstatement or omission" and that
misstatement or omission "must be attributed to the specific actor at the time of public
dissemination." See id. In Wright, the appellant failed to allege that Ernst & Young had
made a material misstatement; therefore, there was no cause of action. See id. at 178.
Alternatively, Ninth Circuit courts have applied a "substantial participation" test to
determine secondary liability. For example, in Howard v. Everex Systems, Inc., the Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit ruled that in order for liability to attach to a secondary
actor, the secondary actor must have substantially participated or have been intricately
involved in the preparation of fraudulent statements. 228 F.3d 1057, 1061 n.5 (9th Cir.
2000). The court noted that other courts have held that "substantial participation or
intricate involvement in the preparation of fraudulent statements is grounds for primary
liability even though that participation might not lead to the actor's actual making of the
statements." See id. (citing Dannenberg v. PaineWebber Inc. (In re Software Toolworks
Inc.), 50 F.3d 615, 628-29, n.3 (9th Cir. 1994)). Judge Harmon did not apply either of the
Central Bank tests in Newby. See Newby, 235 F. Supp. 2d at 587. Under Newby, a person
is liable as a secondary actor if the person "creates a misrepresentation." See id. at 610; see
infra note 99 (discussing further the impact of Judge Harmon's holding in Newby).
88. See Central Bank, 511 U.S. at 191. The Court's rationale for freeing lawyers and
other secondary actors from liability in the instance of corporate fraud was that such
liability would "disserve the goals of fair dealing and efficiency in the securities markets."
Id. at 188. The Court was concerned that the fear of high litigation costs associated with
such liability would hinder the free-flow of professional advice, thus harming corporations
intended to benefit from the statute. See id. at 189.
89. See 15 U.S.C. § 78t. This statute allows prosecution of "any person that
knowingly provides substantial assistance to another person ... to the same extent as the
person to whom such assistance is provided." Id. § 78t(e).
90. See Newby, 235 F. Supp. 2d at 549; see also SEC v. WorldCom, 273 F. Supp. 2d
431 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
91. Robert W. Hamilton, The Crisis in Corporate Governance: 2002 Style, 40 HOuS.
L. REV. 1, 3-4 (2003); Fastow Charged with Enron Fraud, CNN.COM, Oct. 2, 2002, at
http://www.cnn.com/2002/BUSINESS/asia/10/02/us.fastow.biz/index.html.
92. Enron Heads, supra note 35.
93. See id.
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Enron shareholders, who had relied on the fraudulent information,
incurred gigantic losses.94
The scandal prompted several lawsuits raising the issue of
accountability for such fraudulent practices.99 In Newby v. Enron Corp.,
plaintiff shareholders brought a class action suit, not only against Enron's
corporate directors and auditing firms, but also against secondary actors
including Enron's outside counsel, Vinson & Elkins. In assessing
Vinson & Elkins' motion to dismiss, the issue before the court was
whether a law firm was liable as a secondary actor for non-disclosure of
fraudulent information to third parties.97 Pursuant to the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct and the Texas Rules of Professional Conduct, the
court concluded that:
[Pirofessionals, including lawyers and accountants, when they
take the affirmative step of speaking out, whether individually
or as essentially an author or co-author in a statement or report,
whether identified or not, about their client's financial
condition, do have a duty to third parties not in privity not to
knowingly or with severe recklessness issue materially
misleading statements on which they intend or have reason to
expect that those third parties will rely.98
Based on this reasoning, the court denied Vinson & Elkins' motion to
dismiss, thus allowing the possibility of law firm liability.99
94. See Tom Petrino, Enron and Ivan Boesky: Symbols of Their Eras, L.A. TIMES,
Jan. 13, 2002, at Cl. Enron's shareholders suffered substantial harm when its share price
fell from ninety dollars per share to pennies. See id. (noting that shares closed at sixty-
seven cents on January 10, 2002). In addition to the injury to shareholders, thousands of
Enron employees lost their jobs and retirement savings. Id.
95. See, e.g., Newby v. Lay (In re Enron Corp. Sec. & ERISA Litig.), 258 F. Supp. 2d
576, 592-93 (S.D. Tex. 2003); Newby, 235 F. Supp. 2d at 601.
96. See Newby, 235 F. Supp. 2d at 565. The complaint alleged that defendants were
liable "for (i) making false statements, or failing to disclose adverse facts while selling
Enron securities and/or (ii) participating in a scheme to defraud and/or a course of
business that operated as fraud or deceit on purchasers of Enron's public securities during
the Class period .... Id.
97. See id. at 598.
98. See id. at 609-10.
99. See id. at 610. In this case, the lawyers may still be held liable if it is found that
they participated in the material misrepresentation of information to the public. Id. The
SEC proposed this approach to the court in an amicus curiae brief. Id. at 585-86; see also
SARBANES-OXLEY UPDATES, supra note 87. The decision in Newby sets a precedent for
increasing the potential liability for secondary actors who aid corporations in fraudulent
activity. See Kurt Eichenwald, A Higher Standard for Corporate Advice, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
23, 2002, at Al. The significance of this precedent is that it not only sidesteps the law laid
down in Central Bank by the Supreme Court in 1994, but it also represents a more
significant change than any of the other reforms made in the aftermath of the massive
corporate frauds that the U.S. market experienced. Id.; see also Eichenwald, supra (noting
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Forty-one states already include in their rules of professional conduct a
crime-fraud exception to the confidentiality rule. "" In cases where the
lawyer participates in the perpetration of fraud, the attorney-client
that none of the new rules promulgated in response to the Enron debacle accomplished
such an increase in secondary liability). The impact of this decision has yet to be seen. As
it is still subject to appeal, the rule set forth by Judge Harmon in Newby only controls the
law in the Southern District of Texas. See id. However, because the rule is based on a
theory that is being promoted by the SEC, and in light of the other reforms recently
enacted, banks, law firms, and accounting firms should consider the factors that led to this
decision in order to avoid similar increased secondary liability. See id.
100. See Conference Report, supra note 5. The following states permit disclosure to
prevent crime: Alaska, ALASKA RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (2001), Arizona,
ARIZ. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (2002), Arkansas, ARK. RULES OF PROF'L
CONDUCT R. 1.6 (2002), Colorado, COLO. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (2002),
Connecticut, CONN. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (2002) [hereinafter CONN.
RULES], Florida, FLA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4-1.6 (2002) [hereinafter FLA.
RULES], Georgia, GA. STATE BAR R. 1.6 (2002), Hawaii, HAW. RULES OF PROF'L
CONDUCT R. 1.6 (2002) [hereinafter HAW. RULES], Idaho, IDAHO RULES OF PROF'L
CONDUCT R. 1.6 (2002), Illinois, ILL. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (2002), Indiana,
IND. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (2002), Iowa, IOWA CODE OF PROF'L
RESPONSIBILITY DR 4-101 (2002), Kansas, KAN. SUP. CT. RULES R. 1.6 (2001), Maine,
ME. R. BAR 3.6 (2002), Maryland, MD. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (2002)
[hereinafter MD. RULES], Massachusetts, MASS. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6
(2002) [hereinafter MASS. RULES], Michigan, MICH. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6
(2002) [hereinafter MICH. RULES], Minnesota, MINN. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6
(2002) [hereinafter MINN. RULES], Mississippi, MISS. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6
(2002), Nebraska, NEB. CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY DR 4-101 (2002), Nevada,
NEv. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 156 (2002) [hereinafter NEV. RULES], New
Hampshire, N.H. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (2002), New Jersey, N.J. RULES OF
PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (2002) [hereinafter N.J. RULES], New Mexico, N.M. RULES OF
PROF'L CONDUCT R. 16-106 (2002), New York, N.Y. CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY
DR 4-101 (2002) [hereinafter N.Y. CODE], North Carolina, N.C. RULES OF PROF'L
CONDUCT R. 1.6 (2002) [hereinafter N.C. RULES], North Dakota, N.D. RULES OF PROF'L
CONDUCT R. 1.6 (2002) [hereinafter N.D. RULES], Ohio, OHIO CODE OF
RESPONSIBILITY DR 4-101 (2002) [hereinafter OHIO CODE], Oklahoma, OKLA. RULES
OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (2002) [hereinafter OKLA. RULES], Oregon, OR. CODE OF
PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY DR 4-101 (2002), Pennsylvania, PA. RULES OF PROF'L
CONDUCT R. 1.6 (2002) [hereinafter PA. RULES], South Carolina, S.C. RULES OF PROF'L
CONDUCT R. 1.6 (2001), Tennessee, TENN. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (2003),
Texas, TEX. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.05 (2002) [hereinafter TEX. RULES], Utah,
UTAH RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (2002), Vermont, VT. RULES OF PROF'L
CONDUCT R. 1.6 (2001), Virginia, VA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (2002)
[hereinafter VA. RULES], Washington, WASH. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (2002),
West Virginia, W. VA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (2002), Wisconsin, WIS. RULES
OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 20:1.6 (2002) [hereinafter WIS. RULES], and Wyoming, WYO.
RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (2002) [hereinafter WYO. RULES]. Florida, New
Jersey, Virginia, and Wisconsin have mandatory crime-fraud exceptions, requiring the
lawyer to disclose confidential information to prevent a crime or fraud. FLA. RULES,
supra, R. 1.6; N.J. RULES, supra, R. 1.6; VA. RULES, supra, R. 1.6; WiS. RULES, supra, R.
20:1.6.
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privilege does not extend to protect the illegal activity."" Newby opened
the door for further consideration of the duty to disclose when a lawyer
not directly involved in the fraudulent practice discovers such a practice's
102
occurrence.
Six months after the Enron debacle, another scandal raised this issue.' 3
In June of 2002, WorldCom announced a finding of improper accounting,
amounting to a loss of $3.8 billion.114  Like the Enron scandal, the
WorldCom scandal generated a large volume of lawsuits. "11 In July of
2003, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York ruled
on the monetary settlement in SEC v. WorldCom.") The court
emphasized the need for changes in the standards of accountability,
professionalism, and traditional structure of corporate governance.107
The court mandated a new corporate governance structure that included
an active, independent board of directors, unique shareholder
participation in nominating directors, and constraints on executive
compensation packages."'8 The court also required specialized training
for employees in accounting, public reporting, and business ethics."9
Rather than simply punishing WorldCom, Judge Rakoff's opinion served
to encourage positive future corporate behavior."' Recognizing the need
101. See, e.g., N.Y. CODE, supra note 100; see also MODEL RULES, supra note 5, R. 1.6.
102. Newby, 235 F. Supp. 2d at 610.
103. See SEC v. WorldCom, 273 F. Supp. 2d 431,431-32 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
104. V. Sridhar, The WorldCom Collapse, FRONTLINE, July 20-Aug. 2, 2002,
http://www.flonnet.com/fl1915/19150810.htm.
105. See, e.g., Goldstein v. MCI WorldCom, 340 F.3d 238 (5th Cir. 2003) (opining on
action brought by shareholders against the bankrupt corporation alleging that the
corporate officers acted knowingly or with severe recklessness when they failed to write
off millions of dollars of uncollectible accounts); WorldCom, 273 F. Supp. 2d 431 (ruling
on action brought by the SEC against WorldCom alleging massive accounting fraud); In re
WorldCom, Inc., 263 F. Supp. 2d 745 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (hearing action brought by
WorldCom employees seeking recovery of funds invested in the company's 401(k) plan).
106. WorldCom, 273 F. Supp. 2d at 436 (approving the SEC's settlement proposal as
an amount sufficient to punish and deter, while maintaining reasonableness in light of the
complexity of the situation).
107. Id. at 431 (noting that "[tihis case raises fundamental questions about how market
regulators, and the courts, should respond when criminals use the vehicle of a public
company to commit a massive fraud").
108. Id. at 432. The court also encouraged WorldCom's commitment to implementing
all internal controls required under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act by no later than June 30, 2004,
one year earlier than required by the Act. Id. at 433.
109. Id. at 433. The court's rationale in approving the settlement was that the court
had never seen a "large company accused of fraud that has so rapidly and so completely
divorced itself from the misdeeds of the immediate past and undertaken such
extraordinary steps to prevent such misdeeds in the future." Id.
110. See id. Judge Rakoff's opinion in WorldCom provides an example of what
devices corporations should use to ensure future prevention of corporate fraud because
the court balanced WorldCom's reparative actions against dissolution or liquidation.
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to clean up the corporate governance system, Congress also responded to
the wave of corporate scandals."'
E. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act: Demanding a New Exception to the
Confidentiality Rule
In July of 2002, Congress enacted the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in response
to the corporate fraud involving Enron and WorldCom."2 The Act
represented a major effort by Congress to restore investor confidence
and to ensure a higher standard of corporate responsibility."' Congress
recognized that corporate directors and auditing companies were not the
only professions in need of improvement.'1 4  As a result, Senator
Edwards proposed an amendment to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act to increase
the ethical responsibilities of lawyers."' On the floor of the Senate, he
argued:
For the sake of investors and regular employees, ordinary
shareholders, we have to make sure that not only the executives
and accountants do what they are responsible for doing, but
also that the lawyers do what they are responsible for doing as
members of the bar and as citizens of the country.' 6
The resulting legislation not only called for major corporate reform," 7
but also required the SEC to set minimum standards of professional
conduct for attorneys of publicly traded corporations.""
F The ABA's Adoption of the SEC Rules Created After Sarbanes-Oxley:
New Confidentiality Exceptions
On August 5, 2003, in response to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, the SEC
implemented the Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys. " 9
The new rules imposed minimum standards of professional ethics on
111. See infra Part I.E (discussing the enactment and the impact of the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act).
112. Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in scattered sections of 11, 15, 18, 28,
and 29 U.S.C.A.).
113. See H.R. REP. No. 107-610, at t (2002).
114. 148 CONG. REC. S6551 (daily ed. July 10, 2002) (statement of Sen. Edwards).
115. Id. (noting that where corporate executives and accountants are acting, so are
corporate lawyers).
116. Id.
117. 148 CONG. REC. S10563 (daily ed. Oct. 16, 2002) (statement of Sen. Levin)
(describing "the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, [as] a corporate reform law which calls for a host of
changes in the way U.S. business operates, including overhauling accounting oversight,
restoring auditor integrity, and strengthening investor protections").
118. 15 U.S.C.A. § 7245 (Supp. 2003).
119. 17 C.F.R. pt. 205 (2003).
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attorneys appearing before the SEC. 2" Even though several states have
more stringent ethical standards than those promulgated by the SEC, the
SEC standards were designed to preempt any conflicting or inconsistent
standards set forth by any U.S. jurisdiction. 2 ' One week later, on August
12, 2003, the ABA adopted the SEC standards affecting the legal
profession.
2
The most significant changes in the new ABA Model Rules of
Professional Conduct affect the lawyer's permission to disclose
confidential information. 2 The ABA amended Rule 1.6 to permit two
new exceptions to the rule of confidentiality. 4 First, a lawyer may now
disclose confidential information to prevent the commission of a crime or
fraud in furtherance of which the client has used the lawyer's services. 25
Second, even if such a crime or fraud has already occurred, the lawyer
may make disclosures to prevent, mitigate, or rectify any substantial
injury that may result. 26 The changes evolved from the rationale that
120. Id.pt.205.1.
121. Id. Part 205.1 states that the SEC rules will preempt state rules. Id. In
Washington, for example, the state bar reacted negatively to the new SEC rules. See
Masters, supra note 26 (stating that the Washington State bar's ethics opinion prohibits
lawyers from disclosing confidential information unless such disclosure is authorized under
state rules, not the new SEC rules).
122. See Pearlstein, supra note 14. Though the ABA's Model Rules of Professional
Conduct are not binding on states, they are intended to represent policy and standards
that states may choose to adopt. See MODEL RULES, supra note 5, Preface, at vii (defining
the Model Rules as "the adoption of professional standards that serve as models of the
regulatory law governing the legal profession"); see also ABA REPORT, supra note 23, at 4
(noting that "the ABA is well positioned to draw public policy conclusions and to
contribute to the ongoing debate on matters of public corporation governance that affect
corporate responsibility"). State law has largely regulated the legal profession. In fact,
each state has its own set of rules of professional conduct. See, e.g., N.Y. CODE, supra
note 100. The New York Code of Professional Responsibility largely adopted the Model
Rules of Professional Conduct, though with some variation. Compare id. with MODEL
RULES, supra note 5. California's rules, on the other hand, are quite distinct from the
Model Rules of Professional Conduct. Compare CAL. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT
(1992) [hereinafter CAL. RULES] with MODEL RULES, supra note 5. For example, there is
no express confidentiality rule included in the California Rules. CAL. RULES, supra. Rule
2-100 mandates that a lawyer "shall not communicate directly or indirectly" regarding the
matter of representation with another party whom the lawyer knows to be represented by
another lawyer without consent of the other lawyer. Id. R. 2-100.
123. See supra text accompanying notes 6-8.
124. See supra text accompanying note 9.
125. MODEL RULES, supra note 5, R. 1.6(b)(2). The rule only allows the lawyer to
reveal confidential information "to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary...
Id.
126. Id. R. 1.6(b)(3). Connecticut, Hawaii, Massachusetts, Maryland, Michigan,
Minnesota, Nevada, New Jersey, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma,
Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming permit
disclosure to mitigate or rectify substantial loss. CONN. RULES, supra note 100; HAW.
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when a client commits such an abuse against the attorney-client
relationship, that client "forfeits" the protection of the confidentiality
rule.
121
Even when the client does not operate through the lawyer's services, if
the lawyer becomes cognizant of activity "likely to result in substantial
injury to the organization, then the lawyer shall proceed as is reasonably
necessary in the best interest of the organization. , 12" Rule 1.13 requires
the lawyer to proceed by reporting such activity to a higher authority
within the organization. 2 9 Under Rule 1.13, if such higher authority does
not take appropriate action, "then the lawyer may reveal information
relating to the representation whether or not Rule 1.6 permits such
disclosure .. .
Traditionally, the rule only permitted the lawyer to withdraw or resign
from representation if a higher authority within the corporation did not
take measures to prevent the illegal activity.3 '  Furthermore, after
withdrawal from representation, the lawyer was still bound by the rule of
confidentiality under Rule 1.6.131 In contrast, the amended rule mandates
a duty to report "up-the-ladder," while granting a new right to make
disclosures under the rare circumstance that internal reporting does not
133
stop the fraudulent practice.
RULES, supra note 100; MASS. RULES, supra note 100; MD. RULES, supra note 100; MICH.
RULES, supra note 100; MINN. RULES, supra note 100; NEV. RULES, supra note 100; N.J.
RULES, supra note 100; N.C. RULES, supra note 100; N.D. RULES, supra note 100; OHIO
CODE, supra note 100; OKLA. RULES, supra note 100; PA. RULES, supra note 100; S.D.
RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (2002); TEX. RULES, supra note 100; UTAH RULES,
supra note 100; VA. RULES, supra note 100; WIS. RULES, supra note 100; WYO. RULES,
supra note 100.
127. MODEL RULES, supra note 5, R. 1.6 cmt. 7. This is not an abandonment of
attorney-client confidentiality. Indeed, in order to maintain the protection of the
attorney-client privilege, the client need only discontinue the unlawful conduct to avoid
the permissive disclosure. Id.
128. Id.
129. See id. The comment to the rule explains that, "[t]he organization's highest
authority to whom a matter may be referred ordinarily will be the board of directors or
similar governing body. However, applicable law may prescribe that under certain
conditions the highest authority reposes elsewhere, for example, in the independent
directors of a corporation." Id. cmt. 5.
130. Id. R. 1.13(c)(2).
131. Id. R. 1.13(c).
132. See id. R. 1.6 cmt. 14 (stating that even after withdrawing from representation
because the client was perpetrating a crime or fraud through the lawyer's services, the
lawyer is still "required to refrain from making disclosure of the client's confidences,
except as otherwise permitted by Rule 1.6").
133. Id. R. 1.13(b).
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Amended Rule 1.13 represents a significant departure from the ABA's
prior position.1 34  The policy behind the old rule represented the
traditional adherence to confidentiality within the attorney-client
relationship in furtherance of effective legal representation. 35  The
amended rule implies that protecting the public from potential harm
caused by future corporate fraud overrides the necessity of maintaining
confidentiality between lawyers and clients.1
6
II. THE IMPACT OF THE AMENDED RULES ON THE PRACTICE AND
INVOLVEMENT OF CORPORATE LAWYERS WITH THEIR CLIENTS
The ABA's adoption of the new disclosure rules has evoked heavy
commentary and concern regarding the effect of the amended rules on
the role of the lawyer. 137 Much of the initial concern arose after the
enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, one year before the ABA adopted
the rules implementing the new standards.138 The rules, as adopted,
provide the lawyer with more discretion and more leverage, thereby
ensuring greater effectiveness in legal representation. 3 9
A. Plain Language and Legislative Intent of the Amended Model Rules of
Professional Conduct
One of the concerns with the adoption of the new Model Rules of
Professional Conduct regards their imprecise language.' 4  This
imprecision evokes the greater concern surrounding lawyer liability in a




135. See id. R. 1.6 cmt. 2 (noting the fundamental role of confidentiality in the client-
lawyer relationship). Confidentiality is granted to information between clients and
lawyers because the "lawyer needs this information to represent the client effectively, and,
if necessary, to advise the client to refrain from wrongful conduct." Id.
136. Id. R. 1.6 cmt. 7.
137. See supra text accompanying note 14.
138. See, e.g.. Mona L. Hymel, Controlling Lawyer Behavior.- The Sources and Uses of
Protocols in Governing Law Practice, 44 ARIZ. L. REV. 873, 888 (2002) (discussing the
increasing use of "protocols to provide the detailed ethical guidance that is missing in
specialized law practice").
139. MODEL RULES, supra note 5; see infra Part II.B.
140. See Conference Report, supra note 5 (discussing opponents' argument that the
vagueness in the language of the rules diminishes their value).
141. See, e.g., The Evolving Legal and Ethical Role of the Corporate Attorney After the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 52 AM. U. L. REV. 655 (2003). The panel noted that:
There are a lot more questions than there are answers. I think all of us sitting
here could talk at great length about all of the issues that were talked about in
the first two panels, whether it is the desirability of federalization, federalizing
the state ethics, making it mandatory, or you name it. We could all talk about it.
See id. at 661.
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The following analysis will demonstrate that these rules do provide
clarity regarding when and to whom a practicing lawyer should disclose
confidential information. 142 It also will determine that the rules do notintend to impose additional liability on lawyers. 41
1. Amended Rule 1.13
Amended Rule 1.13(b) mandates that the lawyer proceed as he or she
believes reasonably necessary when he or she "knows" that the client has
engaged in unlawful conduct, and that substantial injury to the
organization "likely" will result from such conduct.' 4  Though
mandatory, the rule permits the lawyer to use his or her discretion in
determining the necessity of such action to protect the best interest of the
client.' 4' This mandate only requires that the lawyer proceed by
reporting the illegal activity to a higher authority within theS 146
corporation. If the lawyer reasonably determines that it is not
142. See infra Part III (commenting that the improvements made to the rules of
professionalism will clearly enhance the lawyer's ability to effectively represent clients).
143. See infra Part II.A.1-2.
144. MODEL RULES, supra note 5, R. 1.13(b). The rule expressly requires that an
objective standard be used to determine whether a lawyer has the requisite knowledge to
come within the rule's purview. See id. (implementing a standard of what "a reasonable
lawyer, under the circumstances, would conclude"): see also 2003 RULES, supra note 11, R.
1.0(f) (stating that "knowledge may be inferred from circumstances"). Additionally,
lawyers cannot "shut their eyes to what was plainly to be seen." ABA Comm. on Ethics
and Prof'l Responsibility, Formal Op. 346 (Rev), at 801:102 (1982); 2003 RULES, supra
note 11, R. 4.2 cmt. 8. Once it is determined that a lawyer has knowledge of the unlawful
conduct and before Rule 1.13(b)'s mandate to act becomes effective, the lawyer must
determine that the unlawful conduct is likely to cause substantial injury. MODEL RULES,
supra note 5, R. 1.13(c)(2). As compared with Model Rule 1.6, "likely" provides a looser
standard than "reasonably certain." See id. R. 1.6. Therefore, the mandate in Rule 1.13(c)
would require lawyer action even if the situation does not qualify under the new Rule 1.6
exceptions. But in order for the lawyer to permissibly reveal confidential information
beyond the highest authority of the organization, the rules require that the lawyer meet
the "reasonably certain" standard. See id. R. 1.13(c).
145. MODEL RULES, supra note 5, R. 1.13(b). This language does not differ from the
old rule. 2003 RULES, supra note 11, R. 1.13(b). The drafters used mandatory (rather
than permissive) language, requiring the lawyer to act unless he or she does not
reasonably believe that action is in the best interest of the client. MODEL RULES, supra
note 5, R. 1.13(b). The comments to Rule 1.13 define the "organization" as a legal entity.
Id. at R. 1.13 cmt. [1]. The lawyer must use his or her discretion to determine what is in
the best interest of that entity, not the best interest of a single, organizational constituent.
See id. R. 1.13 cmts. 1-2; see supra Part L.A (discussing the organizational client as a
corporate entity rather than the independent constituents).
146. Id. R. 1.13(b)(3).
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necessary to take action, then the requirement to report the misconduct
to higher authority within the organization will not apply.1
47
The rule outlines how the lawyer may proceed if the highest authority
does not act pursuant to the lawyer's advice in addressing the problem.' 4
The drafters used permissive language for this part of the rule, thereby
allowing lawyers to decide whether to report activity to outside
authorities.4 9 Moreover, this part of the rule does not become effective
unless the highest authority fails to act "in a timely and appropriate
manner" to stop the fraudulent misconduct. '5 It is only in this situation
that amended Rule 1.13(c)(2) permits the lawyer to disclose confidential
information relating to the representation that he or she believes
necessary to protect the organization from substantial injury.'5 ' This
permission extends beyond the scope of the new exceptions to Rule
1.6.' However, the lawyer's discretion to disclose is limited still by his or
her loyalty to the client and the duty to promote the client's best
interest. 3 The comment to Rule 1.13 provides a formulaic evaluation to
guide the lawyer in his or her determination of the proper course of
action with respect to reporting confidential information.15
The legislative intent behind this rule becomes apparent in these
limitations. The rule serves the following goal:
147. Id. R. 1.13(c); see also id. R. 1.13(b) (defining what body of the corporation is the
appropriate higher authority to whom the lawyer should report).
148. Id. R. 1.13(c).
149. See id. The rule states that the lawyer "may reveal information relating to the
representation whether or not Rule 1.6 permits such disclosure, but only if and to the
extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary to prevent substantial injury to the
organization." Id. (emphasis added).
150. See id. R. 1.13(c)(1).
151. See id. R. 1.13(c)(2).
152. See id.
153. See id. R. 1.13(b); see also id. R. 1.13(d) (limiting the circumstances that trigger
the exception). For example, Rule 1.13(d) states that in a case where the lawyer
represents an organization during the investigation of an alleged violation of the law, the
exception does not apply. Id.
154. See id. R. 1.13 cmt. 3. The comment lays out three factors that the lawyer should
consider in determining whether disclosure is consistent with the best interest of the
organization. See id. Specifically, the lawyer should consider circumstances at the time of
determination, such as the lawyer's expertise, the time constraints under which the lawyer
is working, and the lawyer's previous experience with the client. Id. Once the lawyer has
decided to disclose information relating to the violation, the lawyer should consider the
severity of the violation and its consequences, the motive of the person(s) acting illegally,
the person's responsibility within the corporation, the organization's policies on the
handling of such conduct, and any other relevant considerations. See id. R. 1.13 cmt. 4.
The lawyer has the option to either immediately report to the higher authority or to
recommend that the constituent reconsider the action. Id.
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[T]o enhance the lawyer's ability to exercise and bring to bear
independent professional judgment, and thereby enhance the
lawyer's ability to contribute to corporate responsibility without
undermining the constructive and collaborative relationship
that must exist with the executive officers of the corporate client
so that compliance with law can be most effectively promoted.' 5
In furtherance of this goal, Rule 1.13 encourages the lawyer's use of
discretion in determining whether it is necessary to report a violation.
Rule 1.13 does not attach liability to lawyers except where they
unreasonably fail to act.'57
2. Rule 1.6(b)
The adoption of Rule 1.13 was slightly less controversial than that of
Rule 1.6(b). 58 Rule 1.13 amended the procedure for disclosure, 59 while
155. AM. BAR ASS'N, supra note 13, at 6.
156. See supra notes 148-54 and accompanying text.
157. MODEL RULES, supra note 5, R. 1.13 cmt. 4; see also id. R. 1.6 (stating that if a
lawyer "reasonably" concludes that the "best interest of the organization does not
require" that the matter "be referred to a higher authority," then the attorney has met his
or her ethical obligation).
158. See Conference Report, supra note 5 (inferring from the divided vote of the House
of Delegates that adoption of the amended rules did involve controversy).
159. MODEL RULES, supra note 5, R. 1.13. The relevant portions of the new rule state
that:
If a lawyer for an organization knows that an officer, employee or other person
associated with the organization is engaged in action, intends to act or refuses to
act in a matter related to the representation that is a violation of a legal
obligation to the organization, or a violation of a legal obligation to the
organization, or a violation of law that reasonably might be imputed to the
organization, and that is likely to result in substantial injury to the organization,
then the lawyer shall proceed as is reasonably necessary in the best interest of the
organization.
Id. R. 1.13(b) (emphasis added). The rule then states:
Unless the lawyer reasonably believes that it is not necessary in the best interest
of the organization to do so, the lawyer shall refer the matter to higher authority
in the organization, including, if warranted by the circumstances, to the highest
authority that can act on behalf of the organization as determined by applicable
law.
Id. (emphasis added). Finally, Rule 1.13(c) describes the lawyer's options if his or her
conduct, as mandated under Rule 1.13(b), does not succeed in preventing the client's
unlawful conduct. Specifically, Rule 1.13(c) states:
If, (1) despite the lawyer's efforts in accordance with paragraph (b) the highest
authority that can act on behalf of the organization insists upon or fails to
address in a timely and appropriate manner an action or a refusal to act, that is
clearly a violation of law, and (2) the lawyer reasonably believes that the
violation is reasonably certain to result in substantial injury to the organization,
then the lawyer may reveal information relating to the representation whether or
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Rule 1.6 added two new exceptions to the confidentiality rule.'"
Traditionally, the exceptions to the confidentiality rule in 1.6(b) have
been interpreted narrowly.' 6' Drawing on that traditional interpretation,
the new exceptions to Rule 1.6 apply only in limited circumstances.
62
Generally, the exceptions apply when the client actively uses the
lawyer as a vehicle to facilitate fraud. 63  Specifically, Rule 1.6(b)(2)
permits disclosure to prevent illegal fraud when the lawyer deems the
crime or fraud "reasonably certain to result in substantial injury to the
financial interests or property of another.'T '  Additionally, Rule
1.6(b)(3) grants a right to disclose even if the illegal activity has already
run its course, and when the disclosure may "prevent, mitigate or rectify
substantial injury to the financial interests or property of another that is
reasonably certain to result or has resulted from the client's commission
of a crime or fraud.' ', 6' The rule allows for disclosure to be subject to thediscretion.6 In fact, Rule 1.6(b), as amended, does notlawyer's broad i t n fcRue16b, aeddde 
not rule 1.6 permits such disclosure, but only if and to the extent the lawyer
reasonably believes necessary to prevent substantial injury to the organization.
Id. R. 1.13(c) (emphasis added).
160. MODEL RULES, supra note 5, R. 1.6(b)(2-3); see also infra Part II.B (noting that
the interpretations of the new exceptions to the confidentiality rule are no different than
the pre-existing exceptions). The Rule 1.6 exceptions are still narrowly construed and
arise only in limited circumstances. See infra Part II.B.
161. See supra Part I.C (discussing the narrow interpretation of exceptions to the
confidentiality rule).
162. See ABA REPORT, supra note 23 at 44 (stating that privilege should only be
broken when the integrity of the profession or its importance to society is in jeopardy).
163. MODEL RULES, supra note 5, R. 1.6(b)(2), (3). Both exceptions are limited to the
prevention of crime or fraud "in furtherance of which the client has used or is using the
lawyer's services." Id.
164. Id. R. 1.6(b)(2).
165. Id. R. 1.6(b)(3).
166. Id. R. 1.6(b)(2). The lawyer may use his or her discretion to determine whether
"substantial injury" is "reasonably certain" to result. Id. R. 1.6(b)(2). Rule 1.0(h) defines
the scope of the lawyer's discretion to include a range of conduct that a "reasonably
prudent and competent lawyer" would engage in. Standards of Professional Conduct for
Attorneys Appearing and Practicing Before the Commission in the Representation of an
Issuer, 17 C.F.R. pt. 205.2(l) (2003) (citing MODEL RULES, supra note 5, R. 1.0(h)). The
elasticity inherent in the language of the rule represents the intent to grant the lawyer in
this situation maximum discretion. See AM. BAR ASS'N, supra note 13. According to the
American Bar Association the rules were:
[I]ntended to enhance the lawyer's ability to exercise and bring to bear
independent professional judgment, and thereby enhance the lawyer's ability to
contribute to corporate responsibility without undermining the constructive and
collaborative relationship that must exist with the executive officers of the
corporate client so that compliance with law can be most effectively promoted.
Id.
There is no language defining what constitutes a "substantial injury" under the rule. See
MODEL RULES, supra note 5. Still, the choice of language in this rule, along with its
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intend for the lawyer to be held liable if he or she reasonably, however
improperly, determines disclosure unnecessary.167
The comment to Rule 1.6 states that the exceptions to the general
prohibition against disclosing confidential information are limited to the
"extent necessary to enable affected persons or appropriate authorities
to prevent the client from committing a crime or fraud.' 68 Just as
lawyers used their discretion under prior exceptions to disclose
confidential information, lawyers may continue to use their discretion in
determining the necessity of disclosure under the new exceptions.
However, they still may disclose information only under explicit, limited
circumstances as described in the language of the rule.171' Naturally, line-
blurring occurs with a grant of broader discretion, but the limited nature
of the circumstances in which the new exceptions arise should offer
guidance to lawyers in the application of the new rules.' 7' Because the
exceptions are non-mandatory, Rule 1.6(b) does not place liability on the
lawyer acting under the new exceptions."'
legislative history, demonstrates that it was intended to grant the lawyer broad discretion
in his or her determination of whether or not to disclose confidential information. See
AM. BAR ASS'N, supra note 13.
167. See Purcell v. Dist. Attorney, 676 N.E.2d 436 (Mass. 1997) (noting that liability
should not attach to the lawyer as a secondary actor unless the claimant can show
negligence).
168. MODEL RULES, supra note 5, R. 1.6 cmt. 7.
169. See id. R. 1.6. For example, in Purcell, bar counsel stipulated that Purcell, an
attorney, was authorized under the crime-fraud exception to the Massachusetts Rules of
Professional Conduct to reveal to the police his client's intention to commit a crime. See
676 N.E.2d 436, 438. Purcell, "after extensive deliberation," used his discretion in making
the determination to tell authorities that his client, in confidence, had threatened to burn
an apartment building. Id. at 437-38. Noting that the issue of whether an exception to the
confidentiality rule applies is a question for the trial judge, the court determined that
where "[t]here is no public interest in the preservation of the secrecy of that kind of
communication," the exception will apply. Id. at 439; see also In re John Doe Grand Jury
Investigation, 562 N.E.2d 69, 70 (Mass. 1990) (discussing the rationale behind the
attorney-client privilege).
170. MODEL RULES, supra note 5, R. 1.6 cmt. 7.
171. See supra Part I.C (discussing the limited nature of the exceptions); see also
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 41 at 479 (defining "discretion" in criminal and
tort law as "the capacity to distinguish between right and wrong, sufficient to make a
person responsible for his or her own actions. Wise conduct and management; cautious
discernment; prudence."). The new rules are discretionary. Black's Law Dictionary
defines a "discretionary" rule as "involving an exercise of judgment and choice, not an
implementation of a hard-and-fast rule. [A discretionary] act by a court may be
overturned only after a showing of an abuse of discretion." Id.
172. See MODEL RULES, supra note 5, R. 1.13 cmts. 3-4; see id. R. 1.6(b).
2004]
Catholic University Law Review
B. The Practical Impact of the New Rules on Corporate Lawyers
Already, companies, lawyers, and law firms have reacted to the new
rules.173 For example, on July 18, 2003, prior to the adoption of the rules,
Fried, Frank, Harris, Shriver & Jacobson LLP published a memorandum
entitled SEC "Up-the-Ladder" Reporting Requirement: Practical
Suggestions for In-House Attorneys to describe how internal and outside
counsel should comply with the new rules. 74  Specifically, the
memorandum suggested that in implementing new compliance policies,
corporations should consider the development of qualified legal
compliance committees to deal with evidence of criminal or fraudulent
practice. 171 Significantly, this memorandum concluded that the impact of
the new rules requires each company to "devise appropriate procedures
based on its own culture, structure and needs ....
In a newsletter sent out among its firm and clients, Venable LLP,
announced the goals it hopes to achieve through the restructuring of the
173. See Masters, supra note 1 (reporting that the ABA rules were adopted on August
11,2003).
174. "UP-THE-LADDER," supra note 26.
175. See id. Because the establishment of QLCCs may serve to reduce attorney
liability, it is not surprising that law firms recommend their implementation. See Fisch &
Gentile, supra note 20. Fisch and Gentile note that once a lawyer has reported a matter to
the QLCC, the lawyer is relieved of all further obligations under the SEC rules. Id. at 521,
536. Then, the QLCC becomes solely responsible for compliance with the rules. Id. at
536-37. The SEC's creation of the QLCC as an alternative mechanism of preventing
corporate misconduct is itself controversial. Id. at 534. Though it helps to relieve lawyers
of responsibility under the rules, the QLCC may not be the most effective governance
structure. Id. at 541-45. For example, the QLCC is composed of independent directors
who may have limited incentives to pursue actively the best interests of the corporation
and its shareholders. Id. at 558-59. Also, because of the great potential for liability that
flows from the responsibility of the QLCC, it may be difficult for corporations to attract
qualified directors to serve on the committee. See id. at 541-42. Fisch and Gentile note
that "as the burdens associated with being a director increase, . . . success in attracting and
retaining qualified directors decreases." Id. at 541. Despite these potential problems,
several companies have in fact developed qualified legal compliance committees, as "Up-
the-Ladder" suggests. See "UP-THE-LADDER," supra note 26, at 6-7. For example, the
Board of Directors for Sun Microsystems announced that Sun's Audit Committee will
serve as the company's Qualified Legal Compliance Committee. See SUN
MICROSYSTEMS, QUALIFIED LEGAL COMPLIANCE COMMITTEE, http://www.sun.com/
company/cgov/legalcompliance.html (last visited June 14, 2004). In compliance with SEC
rules, the Board permits attorneys to report to that committee in lieu of reporting to Sun's
management. Id.; see also REYNOLDS AMERICAN INC., QUALIFIED LEGAL COMPLIANCE
COMMITTEE CHARTER, http://www.reynoldsamerican.com/gov/chartersjlegal.asp
(adopted July 28, 2004) (authorizing the QLCC to receive and consider reports of material
violations under part 205 of the SEC rules, investigate those reports. make
recommendations to determine an appropriate response, and notify the SEC if R.J.
Reynolds "fails in any material respect to implement an appropriate response that the
QLCC has recommended for adoption by [RAIl").
176. See "UP-THE-LADDER," supra note 26, at 1.
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system of corporate governance required under the Sarbanes-Oxley
reforms.' The newsletter discussed the importance of the corporate
lawyer in guiding executive management and boards of directors in their
new roles and responsibilities."" It also outlined the role of the corporate
lawyer as a watchdog.'7"9 Noting the potential conflicts, the newsletter
posited that it is possible for lawyers to maintain these new roles and
responsibilities without sacrificing the confidences of their clients:
The leadership challenge for corporate counsel lies in balancing
a supportive, "can-do" executive leadership attitude with an
unwavering sense of ethical, professional and legal
responsibility. Our leadership challenge lies in using wisdom,
judgment, diplomacy and creativity to accomplish legitimate
business objectives through honest and lawful means.
Corporate counsel must operate-and be perceived-as both
aggressive business leaders and protectors of the business.'8 0
By following this model, lawyers will capably execute their
responsibilities as required by the new rules.'"
III. APPROPRIATE PROCEDURES IMPLEMENTED IN COMPLIANCE WITH
THE NEW RULES ENHANCE THE LAWYER-CORPORATION
RELATIONSHIP WITHOUT UNDERMINING THE CONFIDENTIALITY RULE
The recent failures in our system of corporate governance directly
resulted in the enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, SEC Rule 17
C.F.R. part 205, and the ABA's adoption of the amendments to Rules
1.6 and 1.13 of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct. As noted
earlier, corporate governance is vulnerable when faced with conflicts of
interest between different constituencies within the corporation. " The
structure of corporate governance was designed to place a check on the
acts of each individual constituent to ensure actions are in the best
interests of the corporation as an entity.'84 Because the lawyer does not
177. Benjamin R. Civiletti, Confidence, Courage and Leadership in Corporate
Governance: Moving Beyond the New Letter of the Law, in VENABLE LLP, THE NEW
STANDARDS OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ASSESSING THE IMPLICATIONS OF
SARBANES-OXLEY 6-7 (2002), available at http://www.venable.com/docs/publication/
952.pdf.
178. See id.
179. Id. at 7.
180. Id.
181. See id.
182. See supra text accompanying notes 6-13.
183. See supra Part I.A.
184. See ABA REPORT, supra note 23, at 2 (discussing the need for reform in the area
of internal corporate governance). The report addresses corporate governance, as well as
the issue of the professional conduct of lawyers, "in the context of the system of checks
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represent individual constituents, but rather the corporation as an entity,
granting the lawyer broader discretion to determine how best to serve
the interests of that corporation will enable the lawyer to represent his or
her client more effectively.19  In turn, this discretion will enable the
lawyer to strengthen corporate responsibility.1
6
Implementing compliance policies and independent, qualified legal-
compliance committees within corporations will encourage the
establishment of more veins of communication within the corporation.
7
Greater internal communication will enhance the lawyer's ability to
fulfill his or her role as counselor, thereby promoting greater corporate
compliance with the law."8 These positive changes to the corporate
governance structure ultimately will increase investor protection and
restore investor confidence in corporate America.'"
To reach this end, the rules permit lawyers to disclose confidential
information relating to the representation of their clients in a broader
number of circumstances. ' " Although increased disclosure may threaten
the confidentiality of the attorney-client relationship, greater harm may
result without an increase.' 9' Furthermore, the rules allowing for
increased disclosure do not broaden lawyers' liability.' 92 Because the
rules are discretionary, the lawyer should balance the interests of the
client and the duties owed to the client when electing disclosure as the
proper course of action.' 93 Only if disclosure best serves the client's
and balances designed to enhance the public trust in corporate integrity and
responsibility." Id.
185. See supra Part II.A.
186. See supra Part iI.A.
187. See ABA REPORT, supra note 23, at 28, 37; see also "UP-THE-LADDER," supra
note 26, at 3 (recommending regular meetings between independent directors and legal
counsel in order to increase the flow of information and analysis to those directors).
188. See ABA REPORT, supra note 23, at 36-37.
189. See 148 CONG. REC. S10563 (daily ed. Oct. 16, 2002) (statement of Sen. Levin)
(including the protection of investors and the restoration of public confidence in corporate
America as ultimate goals of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act).
190. See supra Part II.A.
191. See supra Part II.A.
192. See MODEL RULES, supra note 5, preamble (20) (stating that "[t]he Rules are
designed to provide guidance to lawyers and to provide a structure for regulating conduct
through disciplinary agencies. They are not designed to be a basis for civil liability.").
Imposing secondary liability on attorneys under the new rules would serve to undermine
the attorney's ability to effectively represent his or her client. See supra note 88. Also, the
drafters are sensitive to the negative social impact that imposing such liability would have.
See id. (discussing the court's concern that high litigation costs associated with such
liability would hinder the free flow of professional advice).
193. See H. Lowell Brown, The Dilemma of Corporate Counsel Faced with Client
Misconduct: Disclosure of Client Confidences or Constructive Discharge, 44 BUFF. L. REV.
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interest should the lawyer reveal confidential information pursuant to
Rule 1.13. 94  Granting the lawyer discretion to disclose confidential
information in the best interest of the organizational client serves to
enhance the public's trust and confidence.1
95
IV. CONCLUSION
The ABA's adoption of the SEC rules promulgated under the
authority of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act is a positive development for the
legal profession. The limited exceptions to the confidentiality rule in
cases where the client illegally uses the lawyer's services enable lawyers
to exercise ethical discretion to assist their clients. By promoting a
higher ethical standard within the corporate environment, lawyers will
encourage corporations to act in the best interest of the public. By
providing corporate lawyers discretion, rather than a mandate to reveal
confidential information, the rules augment effective representation and
protect the public good without undermining the lawyer-client
relationship. By granting corporate lawyers this discretion, the United
States makes progress toward ensuring an environment of corporate
accountability.
777, 807-11 (1996). Brown discusses the difficulty in this balance, stating that the
corporate lawyer will have to determine:
[W]ho commands his primary loyalty and how he can adequately fulfill his duties
and responsibilities to each constituent in the face of their conflicting interests.
Because the Model Code and the Model Rules fail to explain how a corporate
lawyer can determine the "entity's" interest in such situations, the lawyer must
confront competing loyalties and duties of confidences to the various groups with
little or no guidance as to how he might resolve the conflicts.
See id. at 778 n.1.
194. See MODEL RULES, supra note 5, R. 1.13.
195. See 2003 RULES, supra note 11, R. 1.6 cmt. 2 (stating that trust is "the hallmark of
the client-lawyer relationship").
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